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ABSTRACT 
DISEQUILIBRIUM ECONOMETRICS ON MICRO DATA 
by 
M. B. Bouissou, J. J. Laffont, and Q. H. Vuong 
Estimation of macro-disequilibrium models is by now well­
developed (see R. Quandt (1982), J. J. Laffont (1983) for recent 
surveys). Though the empirical macro results are interesting, they 
suffer from an excessive aggregation which prevents a sufficiently 
precise discussion of the nature of unemployment. This paper brings 
some empirical evidence to the construction of a more disaggregated 
view of disequilibrium. Individual data on firms collected by INSEE 
through periodic Business Surveys is used to construct the 
distribution of firms over the four possible disequilibrium regimes. 
Then the behavior of this distribution over time is analyzed. Effects 
of some macro variables which are suggested by a simple micro­
disequilibrium model in the spirit of J. Muellbauer ( 1978) and E. 
Malinvaud (1981) are assessed through the estimation of a conditional 
logit model on panel data. 
DISEQUILIBRIUM ECONOMETRICS ON MICRO DATA* 
M. B. Bouissou, J. J. Laffont, and Q. H. Vuong 
The breakthrough paper on disequilibrium econometrics (R. C. 
Fair and D. M Jaffee (1972)) is now more than ten years old. R. 
Quandt (1982) has recently surveyed the development of the econometric 
methods dealing with the particular non-linear models generated by 
fix-price models. J. J. Laffont (1983) has summarized and discussed 
the main estimation results of macro-disequilibrium models. Though 
these empirical results are interesting, they suffer from an excessive 
aggregation which prevents a sufficiently precise discussion on the 
nature of unemployment (classical unemployment vs. Keynesian 
unemployment) and on the appropriate corrective economic policies. 
The purpose of this paper is to bring some empirical evidence 
to the construction of a more disaggregated view of disequilibrium by 
using individual data on firms collected by the Institut National de 
la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE) through periodic 
Business Survey Tests. 1 A great potential of this more disaggregated 
approach is the ability to study the relative shares of classical and 
Keynesian unemployment. For policy purposes it is also important to 
explain why a given sector is in one type of unemployment or the 
other. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces a 
micro-disequilibrium model in the spirit of J. Muellbauer (1978) and 
E. Malinvaud (1981). The model is used to motivate the variables that 
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are considered for explaining the regimes experienced by a firm. 
Section 2 presents the data and describes how the indicator of the 
regime in which a firm is can be constructed from the firm's answers 
to the INSEE surveys. The resulting distribution of the sample of 
firms over the four possible disequilibrium regimes is then discussed. 
Section 3 presents some general remarks on the estimation of 
conditional logit models on panel data as well as on the general form 
of the models that we propose to estimate. Section 4 studies the 
dynamics of the regime distribution by introducing the explanatory 
variables suggested by our theoretical model of Section 1. Section S 
concludes the paper. 
1. A Disequilibrium Model for Micro Data 
Let us consider a simple disaggregated model in the spirit of 
J. Muellbauer (1978) and E. Malinvaud (1981). The production 
function of firm i at date t is: 
yit = fi(1it' kit) 
where lit is the labor input and kit is the capital input. 
Let yit be the efficient production level given the price 
system. This level depends on individual characteristics of the firm 
ai' on the local wage it faces on the local labor market, wit' on the 
average wage level of the economy wt and on exogenous variables zt: 
yit = ai - bwit + cizt + diwt. 
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Let yit be the production level of firm i which would lead to 
full employment on its local labor market. This level is considered 
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We obtain an equation which explains the variable (yit- yit) 
for firm i with macroeconomic variables and with a random personalized 
effect. When possible, these individual effects must be explained. 
For example, the difference between the local real wage and the real 
wage of the economy can be explained by forecasting errors in demand 
as: 
wit - wt = h(eity - ety) + tit 
where eity is the forecasting error made by firm i, ety is the mean of 
these errors, and tit is a zero mean random variable. 
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Leaving the unexplained individual deviations in the error 
term we obtain an equation that can be estimated on individual data: 
A 
yit - yit = A+ ,2.wt + £ zt + h(eity - ety) +&it (1) 
The demand anticipated by firm i is explained by: 
a dit = ai + pigt + yiwt + yixt 
where gt is public expenditures, wt the wage level in the economy, and 
xt a vector of exogenous variables. Then: 
[ a A 
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Explaining partially individual deviations, we finally obtain another 
equation which can be estimated on individual data: 
a A dit - yit = g_ + .ft.gt + :r..wt + §_xt = k(eity - ety) + 11it (2) 
Given (1) and (2) we obtain the following classification:2 
TABLE 1: DISEQUILIBRIUM RF.GIMES 
A a -
Yit > inf(dit'Yit) 
A a -
Yit < inf(dit'yit) 
d�t < yit Keynesian Unemployment (KU) 
Under Consumption 
(UC) 
a dit > yit Classical Unemployment (CU) 
Repressed Inflation 
(RI) 
The probability of each regime is then obtained as: 
a - a A Pr(KU) = Pr(dit - yit < and dit - yit < 0) 
a A A - a A 
= Pr((dit - yit) + (yit - yit) < O and dit - yit < O) 
a A A - a A Pr(UC) = Pr((dit - yit) + (yit - yit) < 0 and dit - yit > 0) 
a A A - - A Pr(CU) = Pr((dit - yit) + ( yit - yit) > O and yit - yit < O) 
a A A - - A Pr(RI) = Pr((dit - yit) + (yit - yit) > 0 and yit - yit > 0) 
From (1) and (2), the qualitative variable representing the 
regime in which a firm is has a probability law which depends on all 
the variables we have singled out: public expenditures, wage levels, 
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and forecasting errors. Finally, if the random variables &it' and llit 
are autocorrelated, we must introduce the regime of period t-1 in the 
explanation of firm i's regime in period t. 
2. Description of Data and Construction of Variables 
This section presents the data that is used in our empirical 
analysis. As suggested by the previous theoretical disaggregated 
disequilibrium model, we need to use both individual and aggregate 
data. 
a. Individual Data 
Our micro data has been collected by INSEE from about 4000 
firms through periodic Business Survey Tests.3 These Survey Tests 
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were taken three times a year (in June, November, and March) from June 
74 to June 78, and four times a year (in June, October, January, and 
March) from June 78 to June 82. 
Only single product firms are retained in the sample. Each 
firm was also classified according to the nature of its product into 
one of the following five sectors: 
1. Agricultural and Food Industries, 
2. Intermediary Goods, 
3. Professional Equipment, 
4. Automobile, Transportation, 
5. Consumption Goods. 
From the firm's answers to these surveys, two qualitative 
variables were constructed: (i) an indicator of surprise with respect 
to the demand received by the firm for its product, and an indicator 
of the regime experienced by the firm during the period. 
The demand surprise indicator, denoted MSD, is constructed 
from the answers to the following questions appearing in each survey: 
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"Indicate the probable change in demand for your product until 
the next survey: increasing, stable, decreasing." 
"Indicate the change in demand for your product since the last 
survey: increasing, stable, decreasing." 
From two successive surveys, we can readily define the variable MSD 
as: 
MSD 
MSD 
MSD 
1 if the firm has over-evaluated its demand, 
2 if the firm has correctly evaluated its demand, 
if the firm has under-evaluated its demand.
4 3 
Let us now turn to the construction of the regime indicator 
IR. In the spirit of our micro-disequilibrium model we are reasoning 
as if each firm has its local product market and its local labor 
market. Let IQ and IL be respectively the indicators of the states of 
the product market and of the labor market that correspond to the 
classification obtained in Table 1. Thus: 
IL = 1 if 
IL = 2 if 
IQ = 1 if 
IQ = 2 if 
A. a -
Yit > inf(dit'yit), 
A. a -
Yit < inf(dit'yit), 
a -dit < yit' 
a -dit > yit" 
Information on the indicators IQ and IL can be obtained from 
the INSEE surveys since in these surveys firms are asked questions 
about their perceived constraints on their product and labor markets. 
In this paper, we shall only present the simplest of the different 
methods that we used to construct IQ and IL. 
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Specifically, the indicator IQ is obtained from the answer to 
the question: 
"If you receive more orders could you produce more with your 
actual capacities?n 
If the firm answers YES we presume, following E. Malinvaud's remark 
(1980, p. 73), that the firm is constrained on its good market (IQ=l), 
while if the firm answers NO we presume that the firm is not 
constrained on its good market (IQ=2). 
Similarly, the indicator IL is obtained from the answer to the 
question: 
"Do you have now difficulties to recruit?" 
If the firm answers YES, we presume that it is constrained on its 
labor market (IL=2), while if the firm answers NO we presume that it 
is not constrained on its labor market (IL=l). 
There are obviously some problems with the interpretation to 
give to these answers; However, various alternative ways of using the 
answers to the INSEE surveys do not change the qualitative features of 
the following results as well as the empirical results presented in 
Section 4. 5 
Provided that a firm's answers to both of these questions are 
available it is possible to classify that firm in one of the four 
possible disequilibrium regimes. Specifically, 
IR 1 (Keynesian Unemployment) if IQ 1 and IL 1, 
IR 2 (Under Consumption) if IQ 1 and IL 2, 
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IR 3 (Classical Unemployment) if IQ 2 and IL l, 
IR 4 (Repressed Inflation) if IQ 2 and IL 2. 
According to this definition of the regime indicator we obtain 
the following tables which present for the whole sample and for each 
of our five sectors, the distribution of the firms over the four 
possible disequilibrium regimes. 
These results can be compared with the ex-post probabilities 
of the different regimes obtained by P. Artus, G. Laroque, and G. 
Michel ( 1982). One major feature of their results is obtained here: 
namely, the predominance of the Keynesian unemployment regime. 6 
It would b� interesting to comment in detail these tables in 
the light of the french conjuncture over the period 75-82. We shall 
only mention two important attempts that were made during this period 
to decrease unemployment with classical Keynesian policies: the Chirac 
experiment from June 75 to June 76 and the Mauroy experiment from June 
81 to June 82. Both share the same features: a strong decline in the 
proportion of firms in the Keynesian unemployment regime with an 
increase in all other regimes. The Mauroy experiment appears less 
effective with a stronger relative increase in the proportion of firms 
in the classical unemployment regime; this is not surprising given 
that in the Mauroy experiment the low real wages have been increasing 
substantially. Note also the dynamics after the Chirac experiment: 
the proportion of firms in the Keynesian unemployment regime 
10 11 
TABLE 2: ALL FIVE SECTORS TABLE 3: AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD INDUSTRIES 
KEYNESIAN UNDER CLASSICAL REPRESSED KEYNESIAN UNDER CLASSICAL REPRESSED 
DATE SAMPLE UNEMPLOYMENT CONSUMPTION UNEMPLOYMENT INFLATION DATE SAMPLE UNEMPLOYMENT CONSUMPTION UNEMPLOYMENT INFLATION 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
--
75 03 1,741 67.03 15.51 11.77 5 .69 75 03 190 75.79 14.21 9.47 0.53 
75 06 1,818 69.70 15.51 9.79 5.00 75 06 207 72.95 13.04 12.56 1.45 
75 11 1,869 68.27 14.87 11.40 5.46 75 11 207 68.60 11.11 15.94 4.35 
76 03 1,842 62.81 18.24 11.67 7.28 76 03 219 71.69 15.07 11.87 1.37 
76 06 1,787 51.82 22.50 13.43 12.25 76 06 201 66.17 16 .91 12.94 3.98 
76 11 1,829 55.28 20.78 13.72 10.22 76 11 222 63.06 14.86 17.12 4.96 
77 03 1,923 57.88 18.82 14.30 9.00 77 03 225 69.33 15 .11 12.00 3.56 
77 06 1,917 58.53 18.62 14.45 8.40 77 06 222 65.77 15.77 13 .51 4.95 
77 11 2,119 60.97 18.12 13.07 7.84 77 11 236 61.02 12.71 20.34 5.93 
78 03 2,013 62.49 18.33 12.57 6.61 78 03 226 63.27 13.72 19.47 3.54 
78 06 2,031 59.87 18.07 14.33 7.73 78 06 225 65.33 14.22 16.89 3.56 
78 10 1,785 60.62 17.54 14.73 7 .11 78 10 201 62.18 11.94 20.40 4.48 
79 01 2,036 60.95 16.85 15.28 6.92 79 01 231 69.70 9.52 18.18 2.60 
79 03 1,988 60.82 15.79 16 .35 7.04 79 03 219 69.41 11.42 15.98 3 .19 
79 06 1,965 56.69 15.98 18.73 8.60 79 06 219 65.30 11.87 19.18 3.65 
79 10 1,996 54.61 16.33 20.14 8.92 79 10 220 66.82 11.36 16.36 5.46 
80 01 1, 919 56.70 16.21 18.86 8.23 80 01 210 69.05 8.57 19.05 3.33 
80 03 2,031 54.01 16.45 20 .38 9.16 80 03 228 66.67 11.40 18.86 3.07 
80 06 1,957 56 .11 16.09 18.65 9.15 80 06 218 66.51 11.01 18.81 3.67 
80 10 2,015 63.23 16.63 14.14 6.00 80 10 235 65.53 12.77 16.60 5.10 
81 01 1,804 69.01 14.63 12.42 3.94 81 01 206 68.93 13.11 14.56 3.40 
81 03 1,726 71.55 12.57 12.34 3.54 81 03 176 70.45 11.36 16.48 1.71 
81 06 1,671 73.55 11.19 11.85 3.41 81 06 176 71.59 7.96 18.18 2.27 
81 10 1,774 70.97 12.63 12 .91 3.49 81 10 188 70.75 9.04 17.55 2.66 
82 01 1,832 70.69 11.68 13.37 4.26 82 01 212 73.59 9.43 14.15 2.83 
82 03 1,743 69.31 13.42 12 .79 4.48 82 03 190 70.53 13.68 13 .68 2.11 
82 06 1,648 63.96 15.53 14.93 5.58 82 06 173 67.05 13.29 15.61 4.05 
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TABLE 4: INTERMEDIARY GOODS TABLE 5: PROFESSIONAL EQUIPMENT 
KEYNESIAN UNDER CLASSICAL REPRESSED KEYNESIAN UNDER CLASSICAL REPRESSED 
DATE SAMPLE UNEMPLOYMENT CONSUMPTION UNEMPLOYMENT INFLATION DATE SAMPLE UNEMPLOYMENT CONSUMPTION UNEMPLOYMENT INFLATION 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
75 03 568 61.09 19.01 13.21 6.69 75 03 257 60.31 17 .51 12.45 9.73 
75 06 620 67.26 16.77 10.00 5.97 75 06 248 61.70 20.16 8.87 9.27 
75 11 642 68.85 16.35 9.97 4.83 75 11 265 62.64 19.25 9.81 8.30 
76 03 628 65.13 19.90 9.40 5.57 76 03 225 54.22 23 .11 12.00 10.67 
76 06 619 50.24 26.50 13.73 9.53 76 06 218 47.25 26.60 11.01 15.14 
76 11 626 56 .39 23.00 11.34 9.27 76 11 228 56.14 23.25 8.77 11.84 
77 03 705 57.45 21.42 13 .47 7.66 77 03 212 58.12 22.17 10.85 8.96 
77 06 710 59.44 20.56 11.83 8.17 77 06 203 59.11 23 .65 10.84 6.40 
77 11 794 63 .35 20 .65 10.08 5.92 77 11 215 62.79 20.93 9.30 6.98 
78 03 774 64.08 19.12 10.98 5.82 78 03 200 66.50 20.50 7.00 6.00 
78 06 748 61.37 19.65 11.36 7.62 78 06 197 61.93 24.37 6.09 7.61 
78 10 673 62.56 19.46 11.74 6.24 78 10 184 65.76 19.02 8.70 6.52 
79 01 789 59.95 19.14 14.57 6.34 79 01 193 69.95 20.20 6.22 3.63 
79 03 772 60.36 16.84 15.93 6.87 79 03 191 67.54 18 .33 7.85 6.28 
79 06 767 56.85 16.56 17.99 8.60 79 06 181 65.19 16.58 9.39 8.84 
79 10 790 52.28 17.09 21.01 9.62 79 10 177 56.50 23.16 13 .56 6.78 
80 01 745 54.63 18.12 18.52 8.73 80 01 184 59.24 19.02 11.41 10.33 
80 03 766 50.13 18.41 20.63 10.83 80 03 175 57.72 21.14 9.71 11.43 
80 06 741 51.82 17.41 19.16 11.61 80 06 179 54.19 22.35 7.82 15.64 
80 10 771 58.50 20.36 14.27 6.87 80 10 172 61.05 18.02 10.47 10.46 
81 01 696 68.25 15.08 12.93 3.74 81 01 161 61.49 21.12 8.07 9.32 
81 03 667 71.06 13 .49 11.85 3.60 81 03 156 66.02 17.30 8.99 7.69 
81 06 652 73.16 12.27 11.66 2.91 81 06 149 67 .11 22.15 6.04 4.70 
81 10 718 70.47 14.07 12.26 3.20 81 10 147 67.35 20.41 8.16 4.08 
82 01 719 73 .43 11.96 11.13 3.48 82 01 147 68.03 19.83 8.84 3.40 
82 03 689 73.30 13.64 8.85 4.21 82 03 144 61.81 25 .69 8.33 4.17 
82 06 645 66.36 16 .90 11.63 5 .11 82 06 142 59.86 27.47 7.04 5.63 
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TABLE 6: AUTOMOBILE AND TRANSPORTATION TABLE 7: CONSUMPTION GOODS 
KEYNESIAN UNDER CLASSICAL REPRESSED KEYNESIAN UNDER CLASSICAL REPRESSED 
DATE SAMPLE UNEMPLOYMENT CONSUMPTION UNEMPLOYMENT INFLATION DATE SAMPLE UNEMPLOYMENT CONSUMPTION UNEMPLOYMENT INFLATION 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
75 03 51 78.43 13.73 S.88 1.96 75 03 670 71.34 12.39 11.19 5.08 
75 06 59 84.75 11.86 1.70 1.69 75 06 679 72.46 13.84 9.72 3.98 
75 11 57 71.93 15 .79 S.26 7.02 75 11 691 69.32 13.02 12.45 5.21 
76 03 51 58.82 17.65 11.77 11.76 76 03 712 60.96 16.29 13 .48 9.27 
76 06 59 47.46 22.03 15.26 15.25 76 06 684 50.88 19.15 13.89 16 .08 
76 11 56 53.57 23.21 12.50 10.72 76 11 692 51.59 19.80 16.33 12.28 
77 03 47 57.45 12.77 14.89 14.89 77 03 727 54.61 61.92 16.78 11.69 
77 06 so 56.00 12.00 20.00 12.00 77 06 724 55.25 16 .71 17.96 10.08 
77 11 47 70.21 14.89 10.64 4.26 77 11 819 57.63 16.61 15.02 10.74 
78 03 51 70.59 15 .69 9.80 3.92 78 03 754 59.02 18.44 13 .79 8.75 
78 06 51 66.67 13.72 13 .73 S.88 78 06 802 55.99 16.33 18.45 9.23 
78 10 43 69.77 13.95 6.98 9.30 78 10 678 55.90 17 .11 18.14 8.85 
79 01 48 72.92 14.58 10.42 2.08 79 01 767 56.19 16.04 17.73 10.04 
79 03 45 82 .22 4.45 13 .33 o.oo 79 03 753 55.64 16.07 19 .26 9.03 
79 06 44 75.00 11.36 11.37 2.27 79 06 748 50.80 16.71 22.06 10.43 
79 10 43 62.79 9.30 23.26 4.65 79 10 759 52.57 15.94 21.61 9.88 
80 01 40 67.50 17.50 15.00 o.oo 80 01 734 54.09 15.80 20.98 9.13 
80 03 42 52.38 26 .19 9.52 11.91 80 03 814 53 .69 14.37 23 .22 8.72 
80 06 36 44.45 16.67 19.44 19.44 80 06 777 58.43 14.80 20.46 6.31 
80 10 37 62.16 16.22 10.81 10.81 80 10 793 67.85 13 .87 14.12 4.16 
81 01 36 77 .78 16.66 2.78 2.78 81 01 698 71.35 13.03 12.61 3.01 
81 03 39 71.80 20.51 5.13 2.56 81 03 681 73.86 10.43 12.77 2.94 
81 06 37 89.19 8.11 2.70 o.oo 81 06 653 75 .19 8.73 11.95 4.13 
81 10 36 77 .78 11.11 8.33 2.78 81 10 678 72.27 10.47 13.42 3.84 
82 01 30 73.34 10.00 13.33 3.33 82 01 717 67.64 10.46 16 .18 5.72 
82 03 34 73.53 17.65 S.88 2.94 82 03 680 55.47 10.29 17.65 5.59 
82 06 39 69.23 12.82 15 .39 2.56 82 06 644 61.49 12.27 19.56 6.68 
increases again, but the proportion of firms in the classical 
unemployment regime continues to increase. 
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Tables 3 to 7 also show differences with respect to 
sensibility among the five sectors: the intermediary good sector and 
professional equipment sector are the slowest to react; the automobile 
and transportation sector reacts quite strongly and rapidly; the 
consumption good sector reacts quickly but not as strongly. 
Finally, the substantial increase in Keynesian unemployment 
from June 80 to January 81 seems to be due to the second oil crisis. 
b. Macro Data 
Some macroeconomic variables are used as additional 
explanatory variables. All the macroeconomic variables were 
dichotomized and constructed from appropriate series obtained from the 
Comptes Nationaux Trimestriels published by INSEE for the period under 
study. If IX denotes the dichotomous variable associated with the 
latent continuous variable X, then the dichotomization rule is: 
IX 
IX 
1 if X is above a trend, 
2 if X is below a trend, 
where the trend is obtained by adjusting a line on the time series X. 
Two sectorial indicators and two national indicators were 
constucted in this way. These are: 
IGS : indicator of sectorial public expenditures, 
IGT : indicator of total public expenditures, 
ISB indicator of the sectorial real cost of labor as 
17 
ISN 
measured by real gross wages, which include employer and 
employee social security payments and the like, 
indicator of purchasing power as measured by real take­
home pay, which includes personal income taxes for the 
7 whole economy. 
In addition, lags of these indicators are also used as 
explanatory variables. Specifically, if IX is an indicator, 
IXl is the indicator lagged 3 months, 
IX2 is the indicator lagged 6 months, 
IX3 is the indicator lagged 9 months. 
3. Estimation of Dynamic Conditional Models on Panel Data 
then 
All the models that we estimate are conditional logit models 
(see e. g. , D. McFadden (1974), M. Nerlove and S. J. Press (1973,1976)) 
where the endogenous variable is the disequilibrium regime indicator 
IR. As a matter of fact, we consider a special case of the 
conditional logit model since all our explanatory variables are 
qualitative. 
All our models are dynamic in the sense that they all include 
the 3 months lagged regime indicator IRl as an explanatory variable. 
Thus we can think of the remaining explanatory variables as explaining 
the 3 months transition probability from one regime to another. Our 
models are therefore of the form: 
IR I IRl,IA, IB,IC, • • •  
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The parameterization used is the ANOVA parameterization (see M. 
Nerlove and S. J. Press (1976), Q. H. Vuong (1982)). As usual we 
restrict the effect of each explanatory variable to its bivariate 
effect (see footnotes 11 and 12). 
Conditional logit models have been in general estimated on 
cross-section data only. The reason is that estimation of such models 
relies on the usual assumption that the observations are mutually 
independent, an assumption that is hardly justified in time series or 
panel data. Since we are ultimately interested in the effects of 
macro indicators such as IGT that therefore do not vary across 
individuals, it is necessary to use a panel data in order to identify 
these macro effects. 
The purpose of this section is to justify our estimation 
procedure on theoretical grounds. As a matter of fact, our 
justification is valid for the estimation of any dynamic conditional 
model on panel data. 
Suppose first that one has available a complete panel data on 
T equally spaced periods (t=l, • • •  , T) for n individuals (i=l, • • •  , n). 
Let Yit be the endogenous random variable (s) observed at time t for 
the i-th individual. Let Xit and Zt be vectors of explanatory 
variables where Xit vary across individuals while Zt do not. For 
instance, Xit may be IRl or MSD, while Zt may be IGT or IGS. 
Let Y� be the set of variables {Y. , Y. 1, • • •  , Y. t} where 1, s 1, s 1, s+ 1. 
sit. We make the following assumptions: 
ASSUMPT ION A. l (Model Specification): 
For any i=l, • • •  , n, and any t=h+l, • • •  , T: 
t-1 t t I t-1 t-1 t Pr(Yit(Yi, -='xi.-=·Z-=) = Pr(Yit Yi, t-h'xi, t-h'zt-h). 
where Pr(A(B) is the conditional density of the variables in A given 
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the variables in B, and h is the maximum lag specified. It is assumed 
that h < T+l. 
Given the choice of a family (in general parametric) of 
conditional distributions , Assumption A. l is nothing else than the 
specification of the model of interest. 
ASSUMPTION A.2 (Stability): 
a. For any i=l, • • •  , n, and any t, s in {h+l, • • •  , T}: 
I t-1 t t I s-1 s s Pr(Yit Yi, t-h'xi, t-h'2t-h) = Pr(Yis 
Y
i, s-h'xi, s-h'
2s-h), 
b. For any i, j in {l, • • •  , n}, and any t=h+l, • • •  , T: 
I t-1 t t Pr(Yit Yi, t-h'xi, t-h'2t-h) P I 
t-1 t t r(Yjt 
Y
j, t-h'Xj, t-h'2t-h). 
Assumptions A2 -a and A2-b respectively require that the 
conditional model of interest be stable across time and across 
individuals. Clearly some stability assumptions, which may not be as 
strong, are needed in order to estimate a model. 
The next assumption deals with the sampling of individuals. 
ASSUMPTION A. 3 (Sampling): The n stochastic vector processes 
{ (Yit'Xit);t=-
=, T} for i=l, ••• , n  are mutually independent given the 
stochastic process {Zt;t=-
m,T}, i.e. for any i: 
(Y: .x: ) 1 {(Y: .x: );jfi} I ZT ' 1.-m 1.-m J,-m l•-m -m 
where A 1 B C denotes that A and B are conditionally independent 
given C. 
For instance, if there are no macro variables Zt' then 
Assumption A.3 simply means that the sampling of individuals is 
random. 
ASSUMPTION A.4 (Exogeneity): For any i=l, • • •  ,n, and any t=l, • • •  ,T: 
+m 
+m 1 t xi,t+l'zt+l Yi,-m I xi,-m'zt' 
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If there are no macro variables Zt' then Assumption A.4 simply 
requires that Yit does not Granger cause Xit' or equivalently that Xit 
is strictly exogenous to Yit (see G. Chamberlain (1982), M. B. 
Bouissou, J. J. Laffont, and Q. H. Vuong (1983b)). 
Assumptions A.l to A.4 can be considered as the standard 
assumptions underlying the estimation of a dynamic conditional model 
on panel data.8 It is worth noting that we obtain as a special case 
(h=l,T=l) the assumptions that are implicit in the estimation of a 
conditional model on a cross section, and as another special case 
(n=l) the assumptions that justify the estimation of a conditional 
model on a time series. 
We now consider the likelihood function associated with the 
observations on the panel {Yit'Xit'Zt; i=l, • • •  ,n, t=l, • • •  ,T}. Since h 
may not be null, we shall in fact consider the conditional likelihood 
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function LY.XZ given all the variables prior to period h+l, i.e.: 
LY.XZ = Pr[((Yi,h+l'xi,h+l);i=l, • • •  ,n),Z!+1 ((Y� .x� );i=l, • • •  ,n),Z
h ]. 1.-m 1,-m -m 
We have: 
LXYZ 
with 
LYIXZ 
1-xz 
Ly1xz x Lxz 
T ·i Pr[(Yi,h+l' 
T ·i Pr[(Xi,h+l' 
l, • • •  ,n)l((Y� ,x: );i = l, • • •  ,n),ZT] 1,-m 1,-m -m 
T I h h . h l,n),Zh+l ((Y. ,X. );1 = l, • • •  n),Z ] 1.-m 1.-m -m 
(3) 
(4) 
Since LY.XZ is the (conditional) likelihood for 
(((Yi,h+l'x�,h+l);i=l, • • •  ,n),Z!+l) and since Lxz is the (conditional) 
likelihood for <<xi, h+l;i=l, • • •  ,n),z!+l), it follows that LYIXZ as 
defined in (3) is the conditional likelihood for (Y: h 1;i=l, • • •  ,n) 1, + 
given <<xi,h+l;i=l, • • •  ,n),z!+l).
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We have: 
LY IXZ 
T 
Il Pr[(Y. t; i = l, • • •  ,n)l((Y�
-l ,x: ); i 
t=h+l 1, 1,-m 1,-m 
l, • • •  ,n),ZT] -m 
n T 
Il Il Pr[Y. l«Y�-l XT )· . 
i=l t=h+l 1 t J ,-m' j ,-m ' 
J 
n T n n Pr[Y. IY�-l XT zT ] 
i=l t=h+l 1t 1,-m' i,-m' -m 
n T 
n n Pr[Y. IY�-l xt zt ] 
i=l t=h+l 1t 1,-m' i,-m' -m 
l, • • •  ,n),ZT ] -m 
where the first equation is an identity, the second and third 
equations follow from Assumption A.3, and the fourth equation from 
Assumption A.4. Moreover, it follows from Assumption A.l that: 
n T 
l.y(xz= fl fl Pr[Y 
i=l t=h+l it 
and from Assumption A.2 that: 
n T 
t-1 t t Yi,t-h'xi,t-h'zt-h1 
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Ly(xz= fl fl Pr[Y=y 
i=l t=h+l it 
1 t-1 0 t 0 t Yh=yi,t-h'Xb.=
xi,t-h'Zh=zt-h] ( 5) 
t-1 t where Yit' Yi,t-h' xi,t-h' z!-h 
are the observed realizations of the 
t-1 random variables Yit' Yi,t-h' 
t t _1 0 0 Xi,t-h' Zt-h' a
nd Y, Yh, X);.• Zj are the 
random variables implicitly defined by the stability Assumption A.2. 
Each of our conditional logit models is estimated by 
maximizing a conditional likelihood function of the form (5) with 
respect to some parameters. From the general properties of 
conditional maximum likelihood estimation (see E. B. Anderssen (1973), 
Q. H. Vuong (1983)) it follows that this procedure leads to consistent 
estimates. It is also worth noting from Equation (5) that the 
conditional likelihood Ly(xz can be written as if all the observations 
were independent where one observation is an observation on a firm at 
a given period. In addition Equation (5) shows that we can pool all 
these n(T-h) observations. 
Finally, as indicated in Section 2, the time length between 
two surveys varies from 2 to 5 months over the period under study. We 
have then considered only the terms in Equation (5) that correspond to 
periods for which a survey is available 3 months earlier, i,e. to the 
following dates: 7506, 7606, 7706, 8706, 7901, 7906, 8001, 8006, 8101, 
8106, 8201, and 8206. The number of observations in each sector, 
where an observation corresponds to a firm for a given date, was: 
23 
Sector 1 : 1241 observations, 
Sector 2 : 4885 observations, 
Sector 3 : 2302 observations, 
Sector 4 : 449 observations, 
Sector 5 : 5293 observations. 
4. Disequilibrium Dynamics 
Our purpose is to explain using the variables that were 
mentioned in Section 1 the transition matrix associated with the four 
possible disequilibrium regimes. As indicated in the previous 
section, we restrict our analysis to the transition probability from 
one state to another 3 months later. Let T+ be the transition matrix 
for the five sectors: 
T+ 
KU UC cu RI 
p(l/1) p(l/2) p( l/3) p(l/4) 
p(2/1) p(2/2) p(2/3) p(2/4) 
p(3/1) p(3/2) p(3/3) p(3/4) 
p(4/1) p(4/2) p(4/3) p(4/4) 
KU 
UC 
cu 
RI 
where p(j/k) denotes the transition probability from state k to state 
j. Let T. be the transition matrix for sector i. 1 
From the observations pooled over the 12 periods that were 
singled out in the previous section we can obtain the following 
observed transition matrices: 
T+ 
Tl 
T2 
T3 
T4 
TS 
85.82· 24.69 24.31 12.13 
7.00 64.24 2.74 18.53 
5.73 
1.45 
2.32 65.45 14.51 
8. 74 7.51 54.84 
89.74 27.49 19.74 16.12 
4.66 68.52 0.31 12.90 
4.95 0.79 75.23 14.51 
0.63 3.18 4.70 56.45 
85.76 25.25 23.83 12.41 
7.74 64.76 2.43 14.67 
5.44 
1.05 
1.76 66.42 17.60 
8.22 7.30 55.30 
85.66 21.67 27.85 8.19 
8.44 68.11 4.45 23.20 
3.74 2.01 57.93 7.85 
2.13 8.20 9.74 60.75 
86.98 25.83 30.86 9.30 
6.62 59.16 1.23 34.88 
4.56 2.50 56.79 6.97 
1.82 12.50 11.11 48.83 
84.52 25.15 24.39 13.91 
6.34 60.59 3.22 18.48 
7.37 3.56 64.89 16.30 
1.75 10.69 7.49 51.29 
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It would be interesting to comment in detail these transition 
matrices. For instance, we can observe some close similarities among 
the five sectors such as a high probability of staying in the same 
regime. Also, the Keynesian unemployment regime appears to be almost 
an absorbing state. These qualitative features must, however, be 
taken with care since these transition probabilites are influenced by 
some macroeconomic variables that were not invariant over the period 
under study. 
Table 8 presents a first set of estimation results that are 
obtained by using only the lagged regime indicator IR1 and the 
individual demand surprise indicator MSn.10 
These results should be read as follows. When the upper tail 
probability (UTP) is larger than 5% it means that the current model 
cannot be rejected against the corresponding unconstrained (or 
saturated) model by a log-likelihood ratio test at the 5% significance 
leve1.11 The number below an explanatory variable is the UTP in % of 
the chi-square Wald statistic that is used to test that the variable 
is significant. If this number is less than 5 it means that the 
suppression of the effect is rejected at the 5% significance level. 
When an explanatory variable other than IRl is significant at the 5% 
level we give for the first category of that variable (IX=l) the signs 
of the effects on the four disequilibrium regimes.12 For instance, 
(+,+,-,0) means that an over evaluation in demand (MSD=l) relatively 
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increases the probabilities of being in regimes 1 and 2, decreases the 
probability of being in regime 3, and has no effect on the probability 
of being in regime 4. 
TABLE 8: MODEL IR/IRl,MSD 
Sector IR I IRl MSD UTP 
1 0% 18 10. ?'lb 
(+,0,0,0) 
2 0% 0 5.53'lb 
(+,+,-,-) 
3 0% 0.137.10 -3 87 .8% 
(+,+,-,-) 
4 0% 44.8 29.8% 
(0,0,0,0) 
5 O'!'o 0 .133 .10-12 24% 
(+,+,-,-) 
As expected from the observed transition matrices given above, 
we find that the lagged regime indicator IRl is strongly significant 
for every sector. We also observe that the demand surprise indicator 
is strongly significant for sectors 2, 3, and 5, while it is not for 
sectors 1 and 4. Sector 1 (Agricultural and Food Industries) always 
gave poor results and we shall abstain from giving any explanation. 
On the other hand, the non-significance of the demand surprise 
indicator in sector 4 (Automobile and Transportation) is probably due 
to the predominance of production to orders in this sector. Finally, 
when the demand surprise indicator is significant it has the good 
signs. By good signs we mean that when a firm has over-evaluated its 
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future demand, it increases its probability of being in the excess 
demand (of good) regimes (IR=l, IR=2) and decreases its probability of 
being in the excess supply (of good) regimes (IR=3, IR=4) . 
For our second set of results, we introduce the macroeconomic 
variables that were suggested in Section 1 and constructed in Section 
2. We only give here a few representative results. 
Sector 2: Intermediary Goods 
IR I IRl MSD IGS ISB _4 0 0 81 0.12.10 
(+,+,-,-) c-.o.o,+> 
IR I IRl MSD IGS IGSl _8 
0 0 57 0.12.10 
(+,+,-,-) (+,0,0,-) 
UTP = 6.43% 
IGS2 _8 IGS3 0.10.10 10 
(-,0,0,+) 
UTP 
IR I IRl 
0 
MSD 
0 
(+,+,-,-) 
IGT 
25 
IGTI 
5.46 
(0,-,0,0) 
IGT2 
1.31 
(-,0,+,0) 
IGT3 UTP 
15 
In this sector a stimulus on total public expenditures has 
after 6 months (IGT2) the expected effect of decreasing the 
probability of being in the Keynesian unemployment regime. Sectorial 
public expenditures do not have, however, a clear effect. A possible 
explanation is the following: In the short run public expenditures 
have no effect (IGS) ; since public expenditures are increased during 
Keynesian unemployment periods, we observe an unexpected negative 
effect (IGSl) ; finally an effect in the expected direction emerges 
after 6 months (IGS2) . The sectorial cost of labor indicator (ISB) 
has significant effects and behaves as an indicator of purchasing 
power since a stimulus leads to a decrease in the probability of being 
5.45% 
21.20% 
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in the Keynesian unemployment regime and to a simultaneous increase in 
the probability of being in the repressed inflation regime. This 
latter remark actually holds for all sectors. 
IR I 
Sector 3: Professional Equipment 
IRl 
0 
MSD 
-3 0.14.10 
(+,+,-,-) 
IGS3 
14 
ISB 
-2 0.25.10 
(-,0,0,+) 
OTP 92.7% 
IR I IRl MSD IGSl IGS2 IGS3 ISB UTP = 76.8% 
0 -3 0.12.10 
(+,+,-.-) 
25 10 3.79 -2 0.17.10 
(-,0,0,0) (-,0,0,+) 
When sectorial public expenditures have significant effects 
(in general after 9 months: IGS3) they have the expected signs since a 
stimulus on public expenditures decreases the probability of being in 
the Keynesian unemployment regime. 
Sector 4: Automobile and Transportation 
IR I IRl IGSl ISG2 ISN 
0 0.72 0.13.10 -2 0.28.10 -2 
<-.o.o.o> <-.o.o,o> (-,0,0,0) 
IR I IRl IGSl IGT2 ISB 
0 4.97 0.51 0.94 
(0,0,0,-) (-,0,0,0) (-,0,0,+) 
UTP = 39.3% 
ISBl 
6.5 
ISN 
0.47.10-l 
<-.o.o,o> 
Sectorial and total public expenditures (IGS and I GN) are 
UTP 
often significant with the correct signs. The indicator of purchasing 
power ISN plays the expected role since a stimulus on ISN decreases 
the probability of being in the Keynesian unemployment regime. 
35.7% 
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Sector 5: Consumption Goods 
IRlO I IRll MSD IGT3 ISN UTP = 17% 
0 0.78.10-12 0.03 0.2.10 -7 
(+,+,-.-) (-,-,0,+) (-,0,0,+) 
IRlO I IRll MSD IGS2 IGS3 IGT2 IGT3 UTP = 27.6% 
0 0.11.10-ll 0.97.10 -9 0.41.10 -1 39 1.87 
(+,+,-,-) (-,0,-,+) (+,0,+,-) (-,-,0,0) 
IR I IRl MSD IGSl IGS2 IGS3 ISB UTP = 56.7% 
0 0.13 .10-
11 10 2.31 0.13.10 -3 48 
(+,+,-.-) (0,0,0,+) (+,0,0,-) 
In this sector total public expenditures after 9 months (IGT3) 
and sectorial public expenditures after 6 months (IGS2) have 
significant effects with the correct signs. Sectorial public 
expenditures after 9 months (IGS3) have significant effects but with 
the incorrect signs. The indicator of purchasing power ISN is 
strongly significant with the expected signs, while the sectorial real 
cost of labor indicator ISB is not significant. 
5. Conclusion 
This preliminary study has drawn the following results. 
First, the stability of the results with respect to the various 
sectors is striking. 
In all sectors we found that demand surprises are very 
significant in explaining the disequilibrium regimes with always the 
expected signs. The strong significance of demand surprises may 
support the view proposed by J. Green and J. J. Laffont (1981) in 
which prices are fixed within each period at levels that equate 
anticipated demand and supply. Disequilibrium regimes are then 
generated by unanticipated shocks. However, the strong significance 
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of the lagged regime indicator does not quite agree with such a view. 
The fact that increase in public expenditures tends to 
decrease the probability of being in the Keynesian unemployment regime 
was clearly shown with a lag of 6 to 9 months. This result does not 
have, however, the stability of the previous ones. Our difficulties 
to obtain clear effects of public expenditures may be due to the 
endogeneity of this variable. 
The index of purchasing power when significant has the right 
sign in the sense that an increase in this variable tends to decrease 
the probability of being in the Keynesian unemployment regime. We 
were, however, unable to exhibit the positive impact of an increase in 
the sectorial wage level on the probability of being in the classical 
unemployment regime. When this variable is significant it plays in 
fact the same role as a purchasing power variable. 
Finally, we must note that our analysis is hindered by the 
predominance of the Keynesian unemployment regime. Our inability to 
make in evidence the effect of sectorial real wages on the probability 
of being in the classical unemployment regime may be due to this 
characteristic of our sample. 
• 
1. 
2. 
3. 
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indebted to E. Malinvaud and B. Ottenwaelter for giving us access 
to the individual data collected by INSEE. 
The possibility of using such surveys for analyzing the 
disequilibria was also suggested by E. Malinvaud (1981) and P. 
Kooiman (1982). 
A 
When Yit < d�t < Yit we say that firm i is constrained on both 
markets on the presumption that it could satisfy a larger demand 
by drawing on its inventories. However, we attribute the case 
d�t < �it < yit to Keynesian unemployment but it could sometimes 
be in the underconsumption regime if the firm produces to 
increase its inventory. 
We present here only the questions of the INSEE surveys that we 
use. For more details on these surveys, see e.g., M. B. 
Bouissou, J. J. Laffont, and Q. H. Vuong (1983a). 
4. The same variable was used by H. Konig, M. Nerlove, and G. Oudiz 
(1981). 
5. Two more complex methods of constructing the indicators IQ and IL 
from the INSEE surveys were tried. For more details, see M. B. 
Bouissou, J. J. Laffont, and Q. H. Vuong (1983a). 
6. The other result obtained by these authors is a great jump in 
7. 
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Keynesian unemployment at the end of 74, i.e., just following the 
first oil crisis. Though this second result cannot be observed 
with the present method of constructing IR due to missing data, 
it can however be observed with the second method of constructing 
IR that was studied in M. B. Bouissou, J. J. Laffont, and Q. H. 
Vuong (1983a). 
For more details on how these indicators as well as their latent 
continuous variables were constructed from the series available 
in the Comptes Nationaux Trimestriels, see M. B. Bouissou, J. J. 
Laffont, and Q. H. Vuong (1983a). 
8. Any of these assumptions can actually be tested. For instance, 
M. B. Bouissou, J. J. Laffont, and Q. H. Vuong (1983b) have 
derived some readily applicable tests of Assumption A.4 when 
there are no macro variables Zt. 
9. The fact that we need here Granger-Sims strict exogeneity and not 
R. F. Engle, D. Hendry, and J. F. Richard (1983) weak exogeneity 
follows from the fact that we are estimating conditional models. 
10. All our empirical results were obtained by using the program CALM 
written by J. P. Link. This program estimates conditional ANOVA 
log-linear probability models (for the theory, see Q. H. Vuong 
(1982)). 
11. This test can be thought of as a specification test. For 
formulas giving the appropriate degrees of freedom of the chi-
square statistic, see S. J. Haberman (1974) and Q. H. Vuong 
(1982). 
12. As mentioned in Section 3, the ANOVA parameterization is used. 
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Since IR has 4 categories, it follows that the (bivariate) effect 
of an explanatory variable with J categories is characterized by 
4XJ ANOVA parameters of which 3X(J-1) are independent due to the 
usual ANOVA constraints. Hence, when J=2 it suffices to give the 
signs of the ANOVA parameters associated with the first category 
of the dichotomous variable. 
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